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“I’d like to thank these funds [Carl Icahn, Nelson Peltz, Jana Partners, Third Point] for
teeing up deals because they’re coming in there and shaking up the management and many times
these companies are being driven into some form of auction.” Thomas H. Lee, a private equity
fund manager.1
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Introduction

Corporate boards have the power to resist a takeover of their company, for example, by issuing
a shareholder rights plan (“poison pill”).2 In principle, directors should use this power to
negotiate a higher takeover premium or to reject coercive bids. However, the separation of
ownership and control creates agency conﬂicts (Berle and Means (1932)), and therefore, there
is a risk that this power would be abused to protect insiders’ private beneﬁts of control and
block takeovers that would otherwise create a shareholder value.3 In those cases, the resistance
to takeovers can be overcome only if the majority of directors are voted out in a contested
election (“proxy ﬁght”). In fact, the power of shareholders to unseat directors is often used by
the courts as the basis for allowing boards to block takeovers in the ﬁrst place (Gilson (2001)).
Shareholders, however, cannot vote out the incumbent directors unless an alternative slate
is put on the ballot. Empirically, bidders rarely launch proxy ﬁghts to replace all or part of the
resisting target board. Most proxy ﬁghts are launched by activist hedge funds (Fos (2017)),4
who often demand from companies they invest in to sell all or part of their assets (Brav et al.
(2008), Becht et al. (2017)). Greenwood and Schor (2009) and Boyson et al. (2016) document
hundreds of activist campaigns that resulted with a takeover bid by a third party, and argue
a causal link. For example, in 2014, the board of PetSmart agreed to be bought out for $8.7
1

The New York Times, “Will Credit Crisis End the Activists’ Run?”, 8/27/2007.
Under most jurisdictions, including Delaware, merger proposals can be brought to a vote for a shareholder
approval only by the board of directors. Alternatively, tender oﬀers do not require a vote, but they are
vulnerable to poison pills, which can be adopted on short notice and make a takeover virtually impossible.
3
Jenter and Lewellen (2015) provide evidence consistent with managers being reluctant to relinquish control
due to career concerns. See also Walkling and Long (1984), Martin and McConnell (1991), Agrawal and
Walkling (1994), Hartzell et al. (2004), and Wulf and Singh (2011)), who show that target CEOs typically
suﬀer from poor career prospects following takeovers.
4
Fos (2017) documents 632 proxy ﬁghts between 2003 and 2012, out of which only 5% were sponsored by
corporations (i.e., potential bidders), 70% by activist hedge funds, and the rest by other shareholders.
2
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billion after facing months-long pressure, which included the threat of a proxy ﬁght from one
of its largest shareholders, the activist hedge fund Jana Partners.5 As another example, in
2013, the private-equity ﬁrm KKR acquired Gardner Denver for $3.7 billion after the activist
hedge fund ValueAct Capital accumulated a 5% stake in the company, ﬁled a schedule 13D,
and agitated for its sale. Highlighting the activist’s role in the deal, KKR’s co-CEO, George
Roberts, said: “We wouldn’t have bought Gardner Denver had not an activist shown up. They
are a nicer form of what in the old days the green mailers and the hostile raiders used to do.
They were great for our business.”6
In principle, both bidders and activist investors can use proxy ﬁghts to pressure companies
to sell, but the evidence suggests that this tactic is mostly employed by activists, not bidders.
Why? What is the relative advantage of activists, if any? In this paper we propose a novel
theory that answers these questions and explains the unique role of activist investors in the
M&A market. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, our main argument is simple. We argue that
bidders have a commitment problem from which activist investors are immune. This commitment problem manifests itself into a stronger conﬂict of interests between the bidder and
target shareholders, which limits the ability of the bidder to win a proxy ﬁght. An important
contribution of the paper is identifying this commitment problem, its potential remedies, and
implications. We further argue that shareholder activism is the market solution for the bidder’s
commitment problem. Our theory therefore proposes that the unique role of activist investors
in the M&A market is making corporate assets available for sale.7
What is the bidder’s commitment problem, and why are activists more resilient? Crucially,
a proxy ﬁght (to oust the resisting target directors) is not a referendum on the terms of the
takeover, but rather a vote on the composition of the board. Once the bidder’s nominees are
elected, the bidder will be tempted to abuse his control of the target board, exploit its access
to the target’s proprietary information, divert resources, and low-ball the takeover premium.
Indeed, as their counter-party, the bidder has the opposite preferences of target shareholders.
5

See The New York Times, “Under Pressure From Jana, PetSmart Says It Will Explore Potential Sale”,
8/19/2014; The New York Times, “Elliott and Jana, Activist Investors, Are Behind 2 Big Buyouts”, 12/15/2014;
and The Deal Pipeline, “Jana Unveils Potential Board Slate for PetSmart”, 11/21/2014.
6
Reuters, “Activism, Economy Weighed on M&A in 2013, Issues Could Linger”, 12/19/2013.
7
We focus on takeovers, but our theory can be applied to divestitures and assets sales as well.
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Without a remedy to this commitment problem, target shareholders cannot trust the bidder;
they will vote against his nominees and the proxy ﬁght will fail. By contrast, activist investors
buy shares with the expectation that the target will be acquired. Unlike bidders, activists are
typically on the sell-side of the negotiating table and have incentives to bargain the highest
takeover premium possible. In other words, activists have a weaker commitment problem.
Since activists enjoy a higher credibility when campaigning against incumbents, they are also
more eﬀective in pressuring companies to sell.
In Section 2, we formalize these arguments by analyzing a simple dynamic bargaining model
in which the identity of the target board, who is negotiating an acquisition agreement on behalf
of target shareholders, is endogenized by an interim proxy ﬁght stage. The proxy ﬁght can be
initiated by the bidder or the activist, but its success requires the vote of target shareholders.
Our analysis highlights three key assumptions: (i) the bidder’s commitment problem cannot be easily solved; (ii) relative to the bidder, the activist is more likely to be on the sell-side;
(iii) relative to the incumbent board, who can at least partially resist a takeover, the activist
has a weaker conﬂict of interest with target shareholders. We discuss the validity of these
three assumptions in detail in Section 3. Consider the ﬁrst assumption. While the existing
institutional and legal framework provides remedies that can potentially alleviate the bidder’s
commitment problem, they are either imperfect or costly to implement. For example, enforcement of directors’ ﬁduciary duties requires litigation which is often costly, uncertain, and
limited to veriﬁable outcomes. Alternatively, the bidder can recruit independent nominees.
However, since verifying their true independence is both costly and imperfect, shareholders
may remain suspicious of their motives. Moreover, it exposes the bidder to the risk that these
nominees, if elected, will be tougher than needed (to protect their reputation) and ultimately
hurt the prospects of the takeover. As another option, the bidder can combine a proxy ﬁght
with a tender oﬀer, but this tactic is not a perfect panacea either. Among other things, it
exposes the bidder to the free-rider problem of Grossman and Hart (1980). We discuss other
potential remedies as well, and conclude that the bidder’s commitment problem cannot be
easily resolved.
Our second assumption asserts that an activist, who is not the counter-party to the trans-

4

action, is more likely to be on the sell-side than a bidder. In general, the incentives of activists
to negotiate a high takeover premium could be distorted by derivatives, ownership in the bidding ﬁrm, or explicit and implicit agreements with the bidder. In most jurisdictions, however,
these arrangements have to be disclosed when votes are solicited, and if they are concealed,
they expose the activist to a legal risk. As long as the masking of these arrangements is costly,
shareholders are more likely to trust an activist than a bidder to represent their interests on
the board.
More fundamentally, however, bidders and activists diﬀer even if the latter have the resources to make a takeover bid. While a typical bidder cannot create value unless he acquires
more than 50% of the target, activist hedge funds often make proposals that can increase the
standalone value of the target even if its ownership structure does not change. Target shareholders know that if they elect an activist to the board and then reject her takeover bid, the
activist will inevitably implement her value-increasing proposal to maximize the value of her
stake in the target. As a result, once elected to the board, the ability of an activist to abuse
her power by low-balling a subsequent takeover oﬀer is limited. In this regard, activists are
more resilient than strategic buyers and private equity funds to the commitment problem.
Finally, target shareholders will replace the incumbent directors with an activist only if
they believe that the latter will show less resistance to the takeover, as required by our third
assumption. Indeed, relative to incumbents, activists are likely to have fewer private beneﬁts
from keeping the target as an independent ﬁrm: Their tenure on the board is shorter (since they
seek an exit of their investment), they have other sources of income (they manage a portfolio
of 10-15 ﬁrms), and their human capital is not tied to the target. Moreover, activists have
more to gain from a takeover: They typically own 8-9% of the target, which is signiﬁcantly
higher than the average ownership of a CEO or a director of a public company. The activist
in our model can pressure the incumbents to sell not because she is perfectly aligned with
other shareholders of the target, but rather, because the activist is less likely to resist a value
increasing takeover.
As a whole, our theory proposes that activist investors have an inherent advantage relative
to bidders in pressuring entrenched incumbents to sell. Importantly, our key observation is
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in relative terms. It does not imply that bidders can never run a successful proxy ﬁght, but
it suggests that these events are less frequent than campaigns in which an activist pushes a
company to sell. This prediction is supported by the fact that most proxy ﬁghts are launched
by activists and not by bidders (Fos (2017)), and by the empirical evidence of Greenwood and
Schor (2009) and Boyson et al. (2016) cited above.
To study the implications of activist interventions on the M&A market, in Section 4 we
endogenize the ownership of the activist in the target and the decision of the bidder to perform
due diligence and engage in takeover negotiations. In general, activists invest either because
they believe the company is likely to become a takeover target (“selection”) or because they can
facilitate its takeover by putting the company into play (“treatment”). When the treatment
eﬀect is in play, bidders interpret the presence of an activist as a signal that the target is
available for sale, and as a result, they are more likely start takeover negotiations when the
target has an activist as a shareholder. Eﬀectively, the activist in our model is soliciting oﬀers
by reassuring bidders that they will face a weaker opposition to the takeover, if the oﬀer is
fair. This analysis highlights the complementarity between shareholder activism and takeovers,
an observation that has several policy and empirical implications that we discuss in detail in
Section 4.
While the aforementioned empirical literature ﬁnds evidence that is consistent with the
treatment eﬀect (e.g., the probability of a takeover is several times higher when an activist
hedge fund is a shareholder of the target), it is hard to rule out the possibility of a selection
eﬀect. We provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which the treatment eﬀect exists
in equilibrium. We show that the model’s comparative statics is sensitive to the existence of
the treatment eﬀect, a feature that can be used to create identiﬁcation strategies for empirical
research. For example, if only the selection eﬀect is in play, the volume of M&A decreases
with the severity of the agency problems in target ﬁrms. This is intuitive, as with more private
beneﬁts of control the incumbents are more likely to resist takeover bids. However, when
the treatment eﬀect is in play, more resistance of incumbents to takeovers can result in a
higher volume of M&A. Intuitively, the resistance of incumbents to takeovers provides activist
investors with opportunities to facilitate transactions that otherwise would not have taken
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place. Knowing that activists would pressure the incumbents to accept a takeover oﬀer as long
as the oﬀer is fair, potential bidders have stronger incentives to approach these companies,
thereby increasing the overall probability of a successful takeover. Based on this logic, the
treatment eﬀect can be identiﬁed by a positive relationship between the severity of agency
problems in the cross section of target ﬁrms and the likelihood of a takeover.
Our paper is related to the literature on takeovers and shareholder activism (for surveys,
see Becht et al. (2003) and Edmans (2014), respectively). Unlike studies in which the bidder
is also a target shareholder (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990),
Kyle and Vila (1991), Burkart (1995), Maug (1998), Singh (1998), and Bulow et al. (1999)),
our analysis emphasizes the beneﬁt from separating the capacity to disentrench boards from
the capacity to increase ﬁrm value through acquisitions. The interaction between bidders
and target blockholders was also studied by Burkart et al. (2000), Cornelli and Li (2002),
Gomes (2012), and Burkart and Lee (2015). Diﬀerent from these papers, however, we focus on
agency problems within the target ﬁrm and on the ability of activists to relax the resistance of
incumbents to takeovers.8 Finally, proxy ﬁghts as a mechanism to transfer corporate control
were studied by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Harris and Raviv (1988), Bhattacharya (1997),
Maug (1999), Yılmaz (1999), Bebchuk and Hart (2001), and Gilson and Schwartz (2001). We
add to this literature by identifying the commitment problem of bidders in takeovers and the
relative advantage of activists in utilizing proxy ﬁghts to relax managerial resistance.

2

The commitment problem in takeovers

In this section we formally identify the bidder’s commitment problem in takeovers and the role
of activist investors in mitigating its ineﬃciencies.
8

Models in which the target board can resist a takeover oﬀer have also been studied by Bagnoli et al. (1989),
Baron (1983), Berkovitch and Khanna (1990), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), Harris and Raviv (1988), and
Ofer and Thakor (1987).
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2.1

Setup

Consider a model with a bidder, an activist investor, passive investors (institutional or retail),
and one public ﬁrm, the target. The target is run by its incumbent board of directors. We
do not distinguish between the manager and other board members; we treat them as one. We
normalize the total number of target shares to one. Each share carries one vote. According to
the target’s governance rules, a successful takeover requires at least 50% of its voting rights.
The standalone value of the target is q ≥ 0. The bidder can add a value of ∆ > 0 by
acquiring the target. If the bidder is a corporation in a related industry then ∆ is the net
operational or ﬁnancial synergy that results from the merger. If the bidder is a private equity
fund then ∆ is the net operational improvement from a going private transaction.9 To focus
the analysis on agency problems as the key friction, we assume that q and ∆ are commonly
known. We relax this assumption in Appendix G, and show that the main results continue
to hold under information asymmetries. We also assume that the activist cannot aﬀect the
standalone value of the target or make a takeover bid. These assumptions are relaxed in Section
3.2.2 and Appendix F.
The bidder negotiates with the target board a cash oﬀer to acquire all target shares. He
cannot bypass the target board and make a tender oﬀer directly to target shareholders, possibly
because the target board can block these attempts using poison pills,10 or because overcoming
the free-rider problem of Grossman and Hart (1980) is too costly. In Section 2.2.1 we relax
this assumption and show that the main results hold as long as the incumbent can at least
partially resist a takeover. As depicted in Figure 1, there are two rounds of negotiations
which are separated by a proxy ﬁght stage. In each round, the proposer is decided randomly
and independently. With probability s ∈ (0, 1) the proposer is the target board, and with
probability 1 − s the proposer is the bidder. The proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to
9

A takeover can increase shareholder value but at the same time destroy value to other stakeholders (e.g.,
employees or costumers). We assume that the target board, its shareholders, and the bidder do not internalize
these externalities, and therefore, they have no eﬀect on the equilibrium outcome.
10
Corporate boards can adopt a poison pill on a short notice; it does not have to be in place prior to the
takeover to deter bidders (“shadow pills”). Triggering a poison pill by moving forward with a tender oﬀer
signiﬁcantly dilutes the bidder and is therefore extremely costly. Virtually all tender oﬀers are conditioned on
the redemption of a poison pill exactly for this reason. Moreover, a poison pill has never been intentionally
triggered by a bidder, which is consistent with the pill being a powerful takeover deterrent.
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the other party, and so, s represents the bargaining power of the target ﬁrm.11 We denote by
π j the takeover premium per share paid by the bidder if an acquisition agreement is reached
in round j ∈ {1, 2}. Any acquisition agreement must be approved by a majority of the target
shareholders in a vote. At any voting stage, target shareholders do not play weakly dominated
strategies. If target shareholders approve the agreement, each shareholder receives q + π j per
share and the target is acquired by the bidder.

Takeover negotiations - round I
bidder vs. incumbent board
agreement

disagreement

reject

Proxy fight
1. bidder and activist decide whether to launch a proxy fight
2. shareholders elect directors

shareholders vote
approve

Takeover negotiations - round II
bidder vs. elected board
agreement

disagreement

shareholders vote
reject

approve

Firm remains independent

Firm is acquired

Figure 1 - Takeover negotiations and a proxy ﬁght

If no agreement is reached at the ﬁrst round or if shareholders vote down a proposed
agreement, the bidder and the activist decide simultaneously whether to run a proxy ﬁght
to replace the incumbent board.12 If a proxy ﬁght is initiated, the challenger incurs a nonreimbursable campaigning cost κ > 0. Target shareholders then decide whether to vote for the
incumbent or one of the rival teams. The team that receives the largest number of votes is
11

The Nash bargaining protocol can be microfounded using Rubinstein’s (1982) model of alternating oﬀers.
We implicitly assume that the majority of directors stand for reelection. In 2013, only 11% of the S&P 500
companies had a classiﬁed board, down from 57% in 2003 (see sharkrepellent.net: “Governance Activists Set
Their Sights on Netﬂix’s Annual Meeting” and “2003 Year End Review”). Alternatively, winning a short slate
proxy ﬁght is suﬃcient to change the dynamic in the board and the ability of the incumbents to protect their
private beneﬁts of control. See Bebchuk et al. (2002) for a discussion on staggered board.
12
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elected and takes control of the target board. If shareholders are indiﬀerent between electing
the rival (the bidder or the activist) and retaining the incumbent, they choose the latter.
Winning a proxy ﬁght gives the rival team the right to negotiate on behalf of the target
shareholders an acquisition agreement with the bidder in the second round. That is, the newly
elected directors can redeem the poison pill, if such exists, and resume negotiations.13 The
newly elected directors maximize the value of the party with which they are aﬃliated, even
if it conﬂicts with maximizing target shareholder value. In other words, the bidder and the
activist cannot commit to act in the best interests of target shareholders (see Section 3 for
a discussion). Once the proxy ﬁght stage ends, a second round of negotiations between the
bidder and the target board (which may now be populated with the newly elected directors)
takes place. The second round has the same protocol as the ﬁrst round, with the exception
that if no agreement is reached or shareholders reject the deal, the target remains independent
and its standalone value is realized.
2.1.1

Payoﬀs

All agents are risk-neutral and have a zero discount rate.
Incumbent: The incumbent board owns n ≥ 0 target shares and has private beneﬁts of
control BI > 0 which are lost if the ﬁrm is acquired or if shareholders elect a new board.
These beneﬁts may include excessive salaries, perquisites, investment in ‘pet’ projects, access to
private information, pleasure of command, prestige, or publicity. We assume that compensation
contracts, including golden parachutes,14 cannot fully align the incentives of the incumbent
board with the shareholders, which is consistent with the evidence by Jenter and Lewellen
(2015). Moreover, we assume that the enforcement of the board’s ﬁduciary duties is not
suﬃciently strong to eliminate the consumption of these private beneﬁts.15 We denote the
incumbent board’s private beneﬁts per share by b ≡ BI /n.
13

Provisions that make pills nonredeemable are illegal in most states, including New York and Delaware.
Hartzell et al. (2004) point out that golden parachutes are often constrained due to IRS tax restrictions.
15
In principle, shareholders can limit the extent of the board’s private beneﬁts by setting the compensation
of directors, changing the corporate charter, choosing the state of incorporation, etc. In Appendix C we show
that in our framework target shareholders could in fact beneﬁt from incumbent boards with b > 0.
14

10

Activist: The activist owns α ≥ 0 shares of the target, which we endogenize in Section 4. The
activist may be conﬂicted with other target shareholders: she obtains private beneﬁts BA ≥ 0
from controlling the target board as an independent ﬁrm. We do not rule out BA ≥ BI , so the
activist may even have larger private beneﬁts than the incumbent board.
Bidder: The bidder has a toehold of m ≥ 0 target shares. Once the bidder has taken control
of the operations of the target, he can potentially divert corporate resources as private beneﬁts
if the ﬁrm remains independent, for example, by exploiting the privileged access as a board
member to the target’s proprietary information or through self-dealing transactions.16
Passive target shareholders: All other shares of the target are owned by passive investors,
who have no private beneﬁts and ability (or incentives) to run a proxy ﬁght. We assume that
collectively these investors hold more than 50% of the target voting rights: n + α + m < 0.5.

2.2

Analysis

We study Subgame Perfect Equilibria in pure strategies and solve the game backward. All
proofs not in the main text are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 (Second round of negotiations) Suppose the ﬁrst round of negotiations has failed.
Then, the expected target shareholder value in the second round of negotiations is


∆

π I ≡ 1b≤ ∆ · [s 1−m
+ (1 − s)b]
if the incumbent retains control,


1−m

∆
q + π A ≡ 1 BA ≤ ∆ · [s 1−m
+ (1 − s) BαA ] if the activist controls the board,

α
1−m



0
if the bidder controls the board.

(1)

To understand Lemma 1, suppose ﬁrst that the incumbent is reelected. Since it is the second
and last round of negotiations, the incumbent can block the takeover. Therefore, he would
agree to sell the ﬁrm only if the oﬀer embeds a premium higher than b, his private beneﬁts
per share. On the other hand, the bidder makes a proﬁt of ∆ − (1 − m) π 2 if he acquires the
16

See Atanasov et al. (2014) for a discussion on the various forms of tunneling, and Atanasov et al. (2010),
Bates et al. (2006), and Gordon et al. (2004) for evidence on tunneling in the U.S.
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target by paying a premium of π 2 for each of the 1 − m he does not already own. Therefore,
the highest premium the bidder can aﬀord to pay is
1. Suppose b ≤
∆
.
1−m

∆
.
1−m

∆
.
1−m

There are two cases to consider:

If the incumbent is the proposer then he would demand a premium of

If the bidder is the proposer he would oﬀer the lowest premium that is acceptable to

the incumbent board and target shareholders, which is b. Indeed, target shareholders approve
any agreement that oﬀers them more than the target standalone value, q. Note that the
bidder overcomes the incumbent’s resistance to the takeover by compensating him for the loss
of his private beneﬁts of control. In this case, the entrenchment of the incumbent beneﬁts
target shareholders (at least ex-post) since it forces the bidder to oﬀer a higher premium
without endangering the deal. Overall, if b ≤

∆
1−m

then the incumbent and the bidder reach

∆
an agreement and the expected takeover premium is s 1−m
+ (1 − s)b.

2. If

∆
1−m

< b then the bidder cannot aﬀord to compensate the incumbent for the loss of

his private beneﬁts of control. The bidder walks away from the takeover negotiations, no
agreement is reached, and the target remains independent under the incumbent’s control. In
this case, the entrenchment of the incumbent board results with an ineﬃcient outcome which
is at the core of our analysis: a value-increasing takeover is rejected.17
Overall, the expected shareholder value under the incumbent’s control is q + π I . Similarly,
the expected shareholder value if the activist is elected is q + π A . The only diﬀerence is that
under the activist’s control the target board has private beneﬁts per share of

BA
α

instead of b.

This dynamic changes when the bidder wins the proxy ﬁght. Since the bidder gains the
authority to negotiate on behalf of target shareholders, eﬀectively, the bidder sits on both
sides of the negotiating table! Unlike the activist, the bidder is interested in acquiring the
target for the lowest price possible. Therefore, regardless of the proposer’s identity, the bidder
would be tempted to oﬀer target shareholders their reservation price q. Moreover, the bidder
would be tempted to exploit his control of the target board to divert corporate resources
as private beneﬁts. This is the bidder’s commitment problem in takeovers. Notice that this
argument does not imply that if a bidder wins a proxy ﬁght, the oﬀered takeover premium
n
If 1−m
∆ < BI < ∆ then a takeover is the eﬃcient outcome under the incumbent’s control even when the
incumbent’s private beneﬁts are taken into account.
17
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should necessarily drop. If the bidder believes that he can win a proxy ﬁght and capture the
target board even without resolving the commitment problem, he would low-ball the takeover
premium in advance (in the ﬁrst round), anticipating his ability to abuse the power of the
target board once elected. This discussion completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Target shareholders, however, rationally expect the bidder to abuse the power of the board,
and therefore, they never elect him to their board. Since running a proxy ﬁght is both costly
and ineﬃcacious, the bidder does not run a proxy ﬁght in any equilibrium of the subgame.
This result holds regardless of the gains from the takeover (∆), the cost of running a proxy
ﬁght (κ), the size of the bidder’s toehold (m), the incumbent board’s private beneﬁts of control
(b), the activist’s private beneﬁts of control (BA /α), and whether or not the activist is also
running a proxy ﬁght. The next result shows that unlike the bidder, the activist can win a
proxy ﬁght.
Proposition 1 (Proxy ﬁght) Suppose the ﬁrst round of negotiations has failed. Then:
(i) The bidder never runs a proxy ﬁght.
(ii) The activist runs a proxy ﬁght if and only if
π A − π I ≥ κ/α.

(2)

If the activist runs a proxy ﬁght, she wins the control of the target board and then reaches
an acquisition agreement with the bidder in which the latter pays an expected takeover
premium of π A .
Proposition 1 establishes our observation that although both bidders and activists can
launch a proxy ﬁght and face the same costs of doing so, only activists can eﬀectively challenge
the resistance of incumbents and facilitate a takeover. Unlike the bidder, shareholders expect
the activist to negotiate a premium of π A ≥ 0 if they elect her to the board. Being on the
sell-side gives the activist an advantage relative to the bidder when campaigning against the
incumbent. Nevertheless, shareholders elect the activist only if she is expected to outperform
the incumbent, that is, π A > π I . The activist, however, does not necessarily start a proxy
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ﬁght even if she expects to win it. If the activist does not challenge the incumbent, the value
of the activist’s stake is α (q + π I ). If the activist runs and wins a proxy ﬁght, the value of her
stake increases to αq + max {απ A , BA }, but she has to bear the cost κ. Notice that if π A > π I
then απ A ≥ BA , that is, if shareholders are willing to elect the activist to the board, it must
be both feasible and in the best interest of the activist to negotiate a deal in which the bidder
is expected to pay a premium π A . The activist runs a proxy ﬁght if and only if she can win
the proxy ﬁght and the increase in the value of her stake is higher than the cost of running a
proxy ﬁght, which gives condition (2). This discussion completes the proof of Proposition 1.
To gain more insight on condition (2), we consider two cases:
1. If

∆
1−m

< b then (2) is equivalent to
δ/α ≤

∆
<b
1−m

(3)

where
δ ≡ BA + max{0,

κ − BA
}.
s

(4)

In this case, shareholders expect the target to remain independent if they reelect the incumbent
(since

∆
1−m

< b) and to be sold for a strictly positive premium if they support the activist

(since δ/α ≤

∆
1−m

⇒ BA /α ≤

∆
).
1−m

Indeed, the activist is less biased than the incumbent

(BA /α < b), and as a result, her threat to run a proxy ﬁght is credible. Here, the activist’s
presence complements the eﬀort of the bidder to acquire the target.
2. If b ≤

∆
1−m

then (2) is equivalent to
b+

∆
κ/α
< BA /α ≤
.
1−s
1−m

(5)

In this case, the incumbent will reach an agreement with the bidder if he is reelected, but
under this agreement shareholders receive a takeover premium of π I , which is lower than the
premium that the activist can negotiate, π A > π I . Shareholders support the activist’s attempt
to replace the incumbent not because it is only the only way to sell the ﬁrm, but rather because
they are concerned that the incumbent is selling the target for a price that is too low. Since the
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activist challenges the deal with the intent of “forcing” the bidder to sweeten his oﬀer (Jiang
et al. (2015)), the activist reduces the rents the bidder obtains from the takeover.18
Accounting for the proxy ﬁght stage and the second round of negotiations, the next result
characterizes the equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 2 (First round of negotiations) A unique equilibrium exists. If
min {b, δ/α} ≤

∆
1−m

(6)

then the bidder reaches an agreement (with the incumbent board) in the ﬁrst round of negotiations in which the bidder pays a takeover premium per share of

π ∗1 =



π A

π I

if π A − π I ≥ κ/α,

(7)

otherwise,

and acquires full control of the target. If (6) does not hold, no proxy ﬁght is initiated and the
target remains independent under the incumbent’s control.
To understand Proposition 2, consider two cases. First, if π A − π I < κ/α then the activist
has no eﬀect on the outcome of the takeover. Without the intervention of the activist, the bidder
and the incumbent reach an agreement if and only if b ≤

∆
,
1−m

in which case the target is sold

for a premium π I . Second, if π A − π I ≥ κ/α then all parties involved correctly anticipate that
if the ﬁrst round of negotiations fails, the activist would run and win a proxy ﬁght, take control
of the target board, and then negotiate an acquisition agreement with an expected premium of
π A . Since the activist’s threat of running a proxy ﬁght is credible, any ﬁrst round oﬀer below
q + π A is rejected by shareholders, and any oﬀer above q + π A is rejected by the bidder. The
incumbent board understands that the takeover is inevitable, and therefore, accepts any oﬀer
higher than q + π A in order to avoid the adverse consequences of losing the proxy ﬁght (e.g.,
embarrassment or loss of reputation). As a result, the bidder reaches an agreement with the
18
This intuition also applies to cases where the incumbent is too motivated to sell the ﬁrm, e.g., in management buyouts or when incumbents are promised large bonuses if the takeover succeeds (Grinstein and Hribar
(2004) and Hartzell et al. (2004)).
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incumbent board in the ﬁrst round in which the target is sold for a premium π A . In these
cases, the credible threat of the activist to run a proxy ﬁght is suﬃcient to change the outcome
of the takeover.19
2.2.1

Limited veto power and tender oﬀers

Assuming that bidders can never bypass the target board and go straight to shareholders by
making a tender oﬀer is not necessary for our main results. Our arguments only require that
corporate boards can partially resist a takeover (through a poison pill or any other defense
measure). In Appendix B, we analyze an extension in which the bidder can overcome the
resistance of the board (i.e., the poison pill) with some probability and make a tender oﬀer
to target shareholders. Similar to the baseline model, the bidder never runs a proxy ﬁght
because of the commitment problem. The activist runs a proxy ﬁght if and only if condition
(2) holds, with the exception that κ is replaced by κ/λ, where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability
that the target board can block the takeover. Intuitively, if λ is low then the bidder has an
alternative mean by which he can overcome the resistance of the board, and therefore, the
activist has fewer incentives to run a proxy ﬁght in order to facilitate the takeover. In other
words, there is substitution between the bidder’s ability to bypass the target board through
tender oﬀers and the activist’s ability or need to unseat the incumbent through a proxy ﬁght.
Ceteris paribus, one would expect activists to play a smaller role in the market for corporate
control in jurisdictions in which boards have weaker power to block deals, such as the U.S. in
the 1980s or the U.K.

3

Discussion

3.1

Overcoming the commitment problem

A key observation from our analysis is that bidders suﬀer from a commitment problem that
harms their credibility, and consequently, limits their ability to challenge an entrenched target
board. Can this commitment problem be solved? That is, can target shareholders ever trust a
19

Note that condition (6) is the union of b ≤

∆
1−m

and π A − π I ≥ κ/α.
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bidder to maximize their value if they give him the power to negotiate on their behalf? Below
we discuss diﬀerent ways by which the bidder can alleviate or overcome this commitment
problem.20 We argue that these solutions are either imperfect or costly to implement. If so,
since activist investors suﬀer from the commitment problem to a lesser extent, they maintain
their relative advantage in pressuring companies to sell. This prediction is consistent with the
fact that activists run and win proxy ﬁghts much more frequently than bidders do.
3.1.1

Legal environment

Eﬀective and strong investor protection laws can help shareholders enforce directors’ ﬁduciary
duties and commit the bidder not to abuse the power of the target board once elected. For
example, when evaluating whether directors have complied with their ﬁduciary duties in the
context of M&A transactions, the Delaware court is likely to apply a stricter standard of review
(Entire fairness rather than Business judgment) if a priori there is a particular concern that the
target board members are conﬂicted with their shareholders. However, there is no guarantee
that the courts or regulators would be able to tell apart related-party transactions that make
economic sense from those which do not. Moreover, litigation and enforcement are often costly,
uncertain, and limited to veriﬁable outcomes. In practice, there is a considerable variation in
how diﬀerent countries cope with corporate self-dealing (e.g., Djankov et al. 2008), suggesting
that a perfect solution may not exist.
3.1.2

Recruiting independent nominees

The bidder might consider recruiting independent nominees to represent him on the target
board. However, this strategy has several shortcomings. First, ﬁnding “truly independent”
nominees that are willing to represent the bidder and have the relevant expertise can be timeconsuming and expensive. Second, even if the bidder could identify independent nominees,
target shareholders (as well as judges) may still be uncertain and suspicious about their true
20

Clearly, if the cost of running a proxy ﬁght is too high then the bidder would not make this commitment even
if he could. In Appendix D we show it is possible that the activist’s threat of running a proxy ﬁght is credible
while the bidder’s threat is not (assuming he committed to act in the best interest of target shareholders), even
though they face the same cost κ.
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motives and incentives. Building a consensus on the independence of the bidder’s nominees
requires shareholders to perform background checks, inspect the nominees’ business ties and
social networks, and verify their disclosures. All of these are costly, time consuming, and
imperfect. Without a consensus, the bidder will be tempted to appoint biased nominees (i.e.,
nominees that would maximize the bidding ﬁrm value) and pretend that they are in fact
independent. As a result, target shareholders would not be able to trust the bidder. Third,
truly independent nominees are likely to care about their reputation. These individuals will
have strong incentives to avoid any discontent (or litigation) from target shareholders once
elected to the board, and hence they may be overly cautious. In eﬀort to demonstrate their
independence, these individuals might be tougher than needed, turn against the bidder, and
ultimately hurt his eﬀort to acquire the target (a case in point is Air Products’s failed attempt
to acquire Airgas in 2010).21 Under those circumstances, the bidder may give up the attempt
to replace the incumbent directors.
Overall, our underlying assumption is a short supply of truly independent nominees with
the relevant expertise and high integrity. If the supply of these exceptional individuals is
abundant, many agency problems, including the one in this paper, could be easily solved.
3.1.3

Proxy ﬁght combined with a tender oﬀer

In the U.S., the bidder can run a proxy ﬁght and at the same time make a tender oﬀer that
remains pending until after the director elections. This tactic, however, is not a perfect solution
for the bidder’s commitment problem for two diﬀerent reasons:
1. It is well known that the free-rider problem in tender oﬀers can result with ineﬃciencies
and deter bidders from approaching targets (Grossman and Hart (1980)). In fact, this is the
reason why Bebchuk and Hart (2001) view the arrangement of a proxy ﬁght combined with a
tender oﬀer as imperfect.22
21

Air Products won a proxy ﬁght in which it successfully appointed 3 directors to the board of Airgas.
Although these 3 directors were nominated by Air Products, they turned against Air Products (claiming the
takeover oﬀer was too low) and helped Airgas’s management to block the takeover. Air Products eventually
dropped its bid and the takeover failed.
22
Bebchuk and Hart (2001) propose amending the existing rules governing mergers to allow acquirers to
bring a merger proposal directly to a shareholder vote without the approval of the board of directors. Under
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2. Under this arrangement, the tender oﬀer is made conditional on the redemption of the
poison pill (and other conditions such as securing funds to ﬁnance the oﬀer). But it is the
target board members who ultimately decide whether to rescind the pill. So, if the bidder wins
the proxy ﬁght and takes control of the target board, the bidder has two options. First, redeem
the pill and consume the takeover (if indeed target shareholders tender their shares). Second,
keep the pill in place, let the tender oﬀer expire, and make a new oﬀer. This is exactly the
commitment problem: The bidder wishes he could commit to rescinding the pill after taking
control of the board, but what forces him to do so? For example, the bidder can always argue
that with the control of the board he also got access to private information about the target
that was not available before (which is common in hostile situations), and this new information
does not justify the price. In fact, as we noted previously, anticipating this chain of events,
the bidder will low-ball the oﬀer in the ﬁrst place, avoiding the need to reduce it if he wins the
proxy ﬁght. If shareholders have rational expectations, they would not elect the bidder to the
board.
3.1.4

Competition

Competition for the target ﬁrm (whenever exists) can also limit the bidder’s ability to expropriate target shareholders. Low-balling the takeover premium while a superior competing bid
is outstanding can be challenging (e.g., the Revlon Rule under the Delaware corporate law).
Yet, by controlling the target board, the bidder can still exploit his access to the target’s private information and divert resources, thereby deterring competition. In fact, due to a bidder’s
privileged access to the target’s private information, the competitors are likely to suﬀer from
the winner’s curse. Overall, the commitment problem is likely to be weaker when there are
competing bids for the target, although the problem cannot be entirely resolved.
the proposed new rule, the bidder can eﬀectively commit to a certain acquisition price. Our analysis suggests
that if a proposal of this nature is adopted, then the role of activist investors in the M&A market would be
diminished.
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3.1.5

Reputation

Serial acquirers or private equity funds, who repeatedly interact in the market for corporate
control, might be able to develop reputation for not expropriating target shareholders. However, building and maintaining good reputation is costly (i.e., avoiding the temptation to
extract value today), it depends on the presence of public histories of past outcomes, and it
can create unintended distortions. Our analysis suggests that repeated bidders (e.g., private
equity investors or serial acquirers) will suﬀer from the commitment problem, but to a lesser
extent than one-time players.

3.2

Corporate control activism

Our second key observation asserts that, unlike bidders, activists can pressure incumbents to
sell. This argument requires target shareholders to believe that the activist is on their side of
the negotiating table (rather than on the bidder’s side), and that if the activist has the capacity
to make a takeover bid for the target, the activist will not abuse the power of the board once
elected (unlike a bidder in the same situation). Moreover, shareholders must also believe that
the activist would resist the takeover, if at all, to a lesser extent than the incumbent. Below,
we examine these conditions in detail.
3.2.1

Are activists truly on the sell side of the negotiating table?

As target shareholders, activists have incentives to maximize the return on their investment by
negotiating the highest takeover premium the bidder is willing to pay. This premise, however,
relies on the assumption that the activist’s economic ownership in the target is not oﬀset by
derivatives. Moreover, it assumes that the activist has no ownership in the bidding ﬁrm or any
other explicit or implicit agreement with the bidder (e.g., the collaboration between Pershing
Square and Valeant during its unsolicited bid for Allergan in 2014).
If these are real concerns, then the activist would lose her credibility, and therefore, her
ability to pressure the incumbent to sell. Note, however, that according to SEC Rule 14a-9,
activists are required to disclose their net economic exposure to the target and the bidding ﬁrm
as part of the proxy solicitation process. Moreover, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016) document
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that activist investors rarely trade derivatives, putting into question the extent of empty voting
(Hu and Black (2006, 2007), Kahan and Rock (2007)) as a common practice used by activists.
These considerations, however, do not rule out the possibility that if the activist wins the
control of the target board, the bidder could oﬀer her side-payments (i.e., bribe) in return for a
favorable treatment. Nevertheless, side-payments are outright illegal, and bribing a third party
(such as an activist hedge fund manager) involves the risk of being caught. As long as this
legal risk is present and the consequences of being caught are not trivial, target shareholders
are likely to be more suspicious of the bidder’s motives than the activist’s.
3.2.2

Activists as bidders - do they suﬀer from a weaker commitment problem?

Reselling the target The analysis rules out the possibility that the activist would acquire
the target herself and then quickly resell it to a potential bidder. If this strategy is feasible,
target shareholders may not trust an activist for the same reasons they would not trust a
bidder. This strategy, however, is unlikely to be proﬁtable for several reasons. First, it embeds
the risk of not ﬁnding a buyer for the target in a timely fashion. Second, even if the activist
ﬁnds a buyer, her bargaining power at the resale transaction is likely to be very low: Once the
activist acquires the target, potential buyers will take advantage of the fact that the activist
bought the target with the sole purpose of reselling it and that she does not have the ability
or incentives to run the company herself. Third, even if the activist succeeds in reselling the
company at a signiﬁcantly higher price than she bought it, the activist bears the risk that
former shareholders will sue her for a breach of her ﬁduciary duties, using the price diﬀerential
as a hard evidence. Importantly, the commitment problem of the activist in this case is weaker
than the commitment problem of the bidder in the baseline model: When the bidder takes the
ﬁrm private or merges it with his existing assets (rather than reselling it to a third party), a
veriﬁable evidence against the bidder (such as the price diﬀerential) is less likely to emerge.
For these reasons, it is unlikely that the activist will employ this strategy once elected to the
board, and as a result, the activist is more likely to be trusted by target shareholders.
Increasing the standalone value of the target The commitment problem arises in our
setup since the bidder cannot (or has no incentives to) create value unless he acquires more than
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50% of the voting rights of the target. For example, a strategic bidder can realize the synergy
only if the target is merged into the acquiring ﬁrm, and a private equity fund can execute the
operational improvements only if the ﬁrm is taken private, insulating it from public markets.
However, activist hedge funds (as well as other ﬁnancial buyers) may have the expertise and
incentives to propose and execute operational, ﬁnancial, or governance related policies that
increase the standalone value of the target, even if its ownership structure does not change.
We argue that activists who have the capacity to make a takeover bid and the ability to
increase the standalone value of the target (as a substitute to a takeover) are more resilient to
the commitment problem in takeovers, compared to bidders who need to own majority of the
target to realize synergies.
For this purpose, consider a modiﬁcation of the baseline model where the activist plays
the role of the bidder. Suppose that a value of ∆ can be created if the activist’s proposal is
implemented. The proposal can be successfully implemented either by the incumbent or by the
activist. If the proposal is implemented, the incumbent loses his private beneﬁts of control. The
key assumption is that the proposal can be implemented even if the target remains independent
after the failure of the second round of negotiations.
Proposition 3 Suppose the ﬁrst round of negotiations fails. If the activist can increase the
standalone value of the target, she runs a proxy ﬁght if and only if
κ/α
∆
≤
< b,
1−α
1−α

(8)

and whenever the activist runs a proxy ﬁght, she wins.
Intuitively, while the activist may be tempted to low-ball the takeover oﬀer once she gets
control of the target board, these attempts are doomed to fail since target shareholders know
that if they reject the oﬀer, the activist will inevitably implement the value-increasing proposal
in order to maximize the value of her own stake in the target. Therefore, shareholders would
not fear electing the activist to the board even if she can make a takeover bid. In this respect,
ﬁnancial buyers such as activist hedge funds are more resilient than strategic buyers to the
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commitment problem in takeovers.23
3.2.3

Are activists less biased against takeovers than incumbents?

The bias of the activist and the incumbent against the takeover is determined by their ownership
in the target and the amount of private beneﬁts of control they obtain from keeping the target
independent. Given the private beneﬁts, larger ownership eﬀectively implies a smaller bias
against the takeover. There are two reasons why activists are likely to be less biased than
incumbents, that is,

BA
α

<

BI
:
n

1. Activists are likely to have fewer private beneﬁts from keeping the target as an independent
ﬁrm (BA ≤ BI ). It is quite rare to ﬁnd an activist staying on the board of a portfolio company
for more than a year (partly because insider trading rules put restrictions on activists, who
ultimately seek to exit and pursue other investment opportunities). A short tenure on the
board limits the ability of activist hedge fund managers to consume private beneﬁts (such as
perquisites, publicity, prestige) from keeping the ﬁrm independent. Moreover, executives and
directors of public companies are unlikely to ﬁnd a good substitute for their job if a takeover
takes place and they are ﬁred (e.g., Harford (2003)). Their ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment could be
lost if the target is acquired. By contrast, activist hedge fund managers hold a portfolio of
10-15 ﬁrms and their reputation depend on the aggregate performance of their portfolio.
2. Activists own a larger stake in the target (α ≥ n). In practice, activists typically own
8-9% of the target ﬁrm when they run a campaign (e.g., Brav et al. (2008)), while managers
and directors typically own much less. For example, Murphy (2013) ﬁnds that the median
percentage ownership of CEOs in S&P 500 ﬁrms is around 0.5%. For non-CEO executives the
numbers are even lower, and directors typically earn annually no more than $250K, a large
portion of which is in ﬁxed salaries.
23

Consistent with this argument, Boyson et al. (2016) ﬁnd that in 15% of the events in their sample the
activist is also making a takeover bid to the target company.
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4

Activist’s position building and deal solicitation

Building on the insights from the baseline model, in this section we extend it to study the
implications of activist interventions in the M&A market.

4.1

Modiﬁed setup

Suppose ∆ is initially unknown and let ζ ∈ {0, 1} be a random variable with a common
prior Pr [ζ = 1] = µ ∈ (0, 1). If ζ = 0 then the ﬁrm is not a viable target and ∆ ≤ 0
with certainty. If ζ = 1 then the acquisition can create value and Pr [∆ > 0|ζ = 1] > 0. The
cumulative distribution function of ∆ conditional on ζ = 1 is given by F , which is diﬀerentiable
and has full support over the real line. We assume E [∆|ζ = 1] ≤ 0, which guarantees that
the bidder will not acquire the target without ﬁrst performing due diligence of ∆, as we
specify below. Intuitively, corporate assets with which the bidder can create enough synergies
to compensate for transaction costs (as well as distraction of management and employees,
increased uncertainty, and additional regulations) are scarce.
At the outset, the activist privately observes signal y ∈ {0, 1} on ζ where

 1
if ζ = 1
Pr [y = 1|ζ] =
 1 − φ if ζ = 0

(9)

and φ ∈ (0, 1]. If y = 0 then the activist infers with certainty that ζ = 0. If y = 1 she updates
her beliefs about ζ = 1 upward from µ to µ̂ ≡

µ
.
1−φ(1−µ)

The activist does not own shares

of the target initially, but she can submit an order to buy α ≥ 0 shares from a risk-neutral,
competitive, and uninformed market maker. Short sales are not allowed. The share price,
denoted by p, is set equal to the expected value of the target conditional on the total order
ﬂows. For simplicity, we assume that the market maker can condition the price on the orderﬂow if and only if the order is strictly larger than α ∈ (0, 1). That is, the stock is perfectly
liquid (illiquid) for small (large) orders.24 Alternatively, α can be interpreted as the disclosure
24

A previous version of the paper assumed the existence of liquidity traders a la Kyle (1985) and showed
that similar results hold under this alternative formulation.
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threshold for regulations 13D or 13G. Moreover, we assume that buying up to α shares does
not trigger a poison pill if such exists. Empirically, α ∈ [5%, 10%]. We also assume that the
activist has limited funds, denoted by R > 0, that she can use to invest in the target. If the
activist is indiﬀerent between investing and not, we assume that she does not invest.
The bidder perfectly observes ζ and the number of shares bought by the activist. For
simplicity, we abstract from the bidder’s decision to build a toehold and assume m = 0. The
bidder then decides whether to perform due diligence:25 He can pay c ≥ 0 and learn the exact
value of ∆. The cost c, which is privately observed by the bidder, is drawn from a continuous
cumulative distribution G with full support on [0, ∞), and it is independent of all other random
variables. If the bidder performs due diligence, ∆ becomes public and the takeover negotiations
unfold as in the baseline model.
Finally, we focus on cases in which the activist can facilitate the takeover: We assume
BA (1 − s) ≤ κ, which guarantees that condition (5) does not hold for any α.26

4.2

Analysis

We solve for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure strategies of the extended model. We
start with the following corollary of Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 Suppose the bidder performs due diligence and the activist owns α shares of the
target. Conditional on ζ, the expected shareholder value is q + ζv (α), the bidder’s expected
proﬁt is ζ (w(α) − v(α)), and the expected value (net of any private beneﬁts) created by the
takeover is ζw (α), where
v (α) =

Z

b

∞

π I (∆) dF (∆) +

Z

b

π A (∆, α) dF (∆)

(10)

min{b,δ/α}
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Our assumption that the bidder’s decision to perform due diligence is made after the activist’s position is
revealed is consistent with Boyson et al. (2016), who ﬁnd that in 70% of the events in their sample a takeover
bid is announced within 2 years of a hedge fund initiating an activist campaign.
26
If BA > κ/ (1 − s) then the anticipation that the activist will put pressure on the target board to demand
a higher premium would weaken the incentives of the bidder to perform due diligence.
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and
w (α) =

Z

∞

∆dF (∆) .

(11)

min{b,δ/α}

All three terms strictly increase in α when δ/α < b, and are invariant to α otherwise.27
Since on average the takeover does not create value, the bidder never acquires the target
without ﬁrst performing due diligence. According to Corollary 1, if the bidder performs due
diligence then his expected net proﬁt conditional on ζ and α is ζ · (w(α) − v(α)) − c. As a
result, the bidder performs due diligence if and only if ζ = 1 and c < w(α) − v(α). This
observation implies that the expected takeover premium conditional on ζ = 1 and α is
h (α) ≡ G(w (α) − v (α))v(α).

(12)

Since w(α) − v(α) and v(α) weakly increase in α, the expected takeover premium also weakly
increases in α.
The decision of the activist to buy target shares depends on the share price p and her
private information about ∆. If y = 0 then the activist expects any takeover attempt to fail
for sure. Since the activist cannot proﬁt from investing in the target, she does not buy any of
its shares. By contrast, if y = 1 then a takeover is possible and investing in the target can be
proﬁtable. The next result characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 4 A unique equilibrium always exists. The equilibrium satisﬁes the following:
(i) The activist buys α∗ = min {α∗∗ , α} shares of the target if y = 1 and no share otherwise,
where α∗∗ > 0 is the unique solution of
α (q + µh (α)) = R.
27

(13)

The function v (α) is generally non-monotonic in α: higher α increases the incentives of the activist to run
a proxy ﬁght, but conditional on running a proxy ﬁght, higher α also reduces the bias of the activist against
the takeover, and therefore, harms her ability to bargain a higher takeover premium (π A decreases in α). In
the proof of Corollary 1 we make a technical assumption that guarantees v ′ (α) > 0. The monotonicity is only
necessary for the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
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(ii) If the activist buys α ≥ 0 shares of the target, the share price is given by

p (α, α∗ ) = q +



µh (α∗ )

µ̂h (α)

if α ≤ α

(14)

if α > α.

(iii) For any α ≥ 0, the bidder performs due diligence if and only if ζ = 1 and c < w(α)−v(α).
If the bidder performs due diligence then the takeover negotiations unfold as described by
Proposition 2 given the actual stake of the activist in the target and the realization of ∆.
In equilibrium, the market maker expects the activist to buy α∗ shares if and only if y = 1,
which happens with probability µ. The activist buys less than α shares to conceal her position
from the market maker, and therefore, the latter sets the share price q + µh (α∗ ) as long as
α ≤ α. Oﬀ-equilibrium, if the activist buys more than α shares, the market maker assumes
y = 1 and prices the shares accordingly as given by (14). Given this price function, the activist’s
expected proﬁt conditional on y = 1 from buying α shares is given by
Π (α, α∗ ) = α (q + µ̂h (α) − p (α, α∗ )) .

(15)

An equilibrium requires α∗ ∈ arg maxα∈[0,α] Π (α, α∗ ) subject to αp (α, α∗ ) ≤ R. In equilibrium,
the activist exhausts her funds unless doing so requires buying more than α shares, that is,
either α∗ = α or α∗ p (α∗ , α∗ ) = R (the latter condition is equivalent to (13)). Indeed, the
activist will buy additional shares of the target as long as she can take advantage of her
informational advantage (i.e., α ≤ α) and has the resources to do so (i.e., αp (α, α∗ ) ≤ R).
This explains α∗ = min {α∗∗ , α} .
4.2.1

Selection vs. treatment

Generally, the equilibrium exhibits either “selection” or “treatment”. If the equilibrium exhibits selection, the activist’s stake is too small so the threat of running a proxy ﬁght is not
credible, that is, δ/α∗ ≥ b. Since the activist has no informational advantage relative to the
bidder, she cannot aﬀect his decision to perform due diligence by sharing her information ei27

ther. However, since φ > 0, the activist has incentives to speculate: Knowing the ﬁrm is likely
to be a target when y = 1 gives the activist informational advantage (relative to the market
maker) that makes the purchase of shares a proﬁtable investment. In these cases, the activist
invests in ﬁrms that are likely to be targets, but her investment has no real eﬀect.
If the equilibrium exhibits treatment, the activist buys a stake that gives her enough incentives to challenge the board and suﬃcient credibility to get the support of shareholders
when campaigning against the incumbent. Essentially, the activist invests in ﬁrms that are
likely to be targets, and by doing so, she increases the probability of a takeover. There are
two eﬀects. First, if δ/α∗ < ∆ < b then the activist can pressure the incumbent to accept an
oﬀer that he would otherwise reject. Second, if δ/α∗ < b then regardless of the value of ∆, the
activist increases the likelihood that a takeover oﬀer is made by soliciting a deal: The presence
of the activist as a target shareholder signals the bidder that the incumbent is likely to be
pressured by its shareholders to sell the ﬁrm, and therefore, the bidder has stronger incentives
to perform due diligence and start takeover negotiations. In other words, activist investors not
only facilitate takeovers once the oﬀer is on the table, but they can also increase the likelihood
that a company becomes a takeover target in the ﬁrst place.28 This observation also implies
that policies and regulations that undermine shareholder activism but do not aﬀect bidders
directly will still have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on takeovers. For example, the legalization of two-tier
“anti-activism” poison pills will adversely aﬀect M&A even if “standard pills” that prevent
takeovers are already prevalent.29
The equilibrium exhibits treatment if and only if δ/α∗ < b. The next corollary follows from
the characterization of α∗ in Proposition 4.
Corollary 2 The equilibrium exhibits treatment if and only if
δ max

q + µh (0) 1
,
R
α

28

< b.

(16)

Similarly, if the activist were to acquire a stake after the bidder approaches the target, the anticipation
that an activist would show up and pressure the target board to accept the takeover oﬀer can also increase the
bidder’s incentives to engage in takeover negotiations.
29
In 2014, the Delaware court allowed Sotheby’s to keep a unique two-tier poison pill that was purposely
meant to block the activist hedge fund Third Point from increasing its ownership in Sotheby’s above 10%. See
THIRD POINT LLC v. Ruprecht, Del: Court of Chancery 2014.
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According to Corollary 2 (and the explicit form of δ as given by (4)), the equilibrium is
more likely to exhibit treatment if the ﬁrm is less likely to be a target for a takeover in the
ﬁrst place (small µ), the target ﬁrm is smaller (small q), running a proxy ﬁght is less costly
(small κ), the stock is more liquid or the disclosure requirements are lenient (large α), or the
activist has more resources (large R). All of these eﬀects are intuitive, perhaps except for
the eﬀect of µ. All else being equal, larger µ increases the share price of target, and given
the activist’s limited resources, constrains her ability to build a suﬃciently large position in
the target which is necessary to pressure the incumbent to sell. Also note that for suﬃciently
small values of b the equilibrium exhibits selection, and for suﬃciently large values of b the
equilibrium exhibits treatment, as one might expect.30 The eﬀect of BA is ambiguous: Higher
BA harms the credibility of the activist but also gives her more incentives to run proxy ﬁght,
if she can win. The latter eﬀect dominates if BA is small.
According to Proposition 4, the ex-ante probability of a takeover in equilibrium is
θ∗ = µG(w (α∗ ) − v (α∗ )) × (1 − F (min{b, δ/α∗ })).

(17)

When the equilibrium exhibits selection, the activist has no real eﬀect. Yet, the probability
of a takeover is higher when the activist is present as a target shareholder than when she is
not. To see why, note that if y = 0 then the activist buys no target shares, and since ζ = 0,
a takeover never takes place. If y = 1 then the activist becomes a target shareholder and the
conditional probability of a takeover is strictly positive, θ∗ > 0. Intuitively, since the activist
uses her private information on ζ to speculate on a takeover of the target, her presence is
correlated with a higher expected synergy and a higher probability that the bidder makes an
oﬀer. This observation is the reason why identifying a casual link between activists’ presence
and the likelihood of a takeover is challenging.
The comparative statics of θ∗ with respect to b can help to distinguish between the selection
and the treatment eﬀects in equilibrium. It is trivial to show that if the equilibrium exhibits
selection (δ/α∗ < b) then the probability of a takeover is always strictly decreasing in b.
Intuitively, higher b implies that the bidder has a lower probability of reaching an agreement
30

Note that while h (0) depends on b, it is bounded from above by E [∆|∆ ≥ 0].
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with the incumbent at favorable terms, and hence, weaker incentives to perform due diligence.
This can be seen in Figure 2 by the fact that at any point left to the red vertical line, which
marks the border of the selection region, the curve is downward slopping. Since in the selection
region the activist has no eﬀect on the takeover, the same pattern holds if the activist is not
present as a target shareholder. This can be seen by the black curve in Figure 2 which depicts
the probably of a takeover in the absence of an activist. However, the probability of a takeover
can increase with b when the equilibrium exhibits treatment. Indeed, the blue curve in Figure
2 is upward sloping when b is to the right of the red vertical line.31

Figure 2 - The eﬀect of b on the probability of a takeover, θ ∗ .32

To understand this result, note that higher b has two eﬀects on the takeover premium in
equilibrium. First, higher b increases the premium paid when the synergy is large. Indeed, if
b ≤ ∆ then the bidder can aﬀord to pay a higher premium to convince the incumbent to forgo
his private beneﬁts and sell. Second, higher b also increases the credibility of the activist’s
threat to run a proxy ﬁght. That is, the interval [δ/α∗ , b) expands. Since the incumbent is
31

More generally, in Appendix E we give conditions under which the probability of a takeover when b is large
and the equilibrium exhibits treatment is higher than when b is small and the equilibrium exhibits selection.
32
The example in Figure 2 is generated under the assumptions that BA = 0.1, κ = 0.1, φ = 0.5, µ = 0.8,
s = 0.9, q = 10, Pr [∆ > 0|ζ = 1] = 0.5, ∆|∆ > 0 ∼ logN (1, 0.5), c ∼ logN (−2.5, 0.5), α = 10%, R = 1. Under
this example, the activist’s stake (as a function of b) is around 9.5% in equilibrium, which is unique.
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negotiating under the activist’s pressure in this range, the bidder pays a smaller premium.
If b is suﬃciently large, then the likelihood of b ≤ ∆ decreases relative to the likelihood of
∆ ∈ [δ/α∗ , b), and the latter eﬀect dominates the former. That is, the bidder can expect to
pay a lower takeover premium, as determined by the activist’s bargaining power. In this case,
higher b increases the bidder’s incentives to perform due diligence, and thereby, the overall
probability of a takeover. Therefore, contrary to the common wisdom, the probability of a
takeover can increase with the private beneﬁts that incumbents obtain from keeping their ﬁrm
independent.

5

Conclusion

This paper studies the role of activist investors in the market for corporate control. We
identify a commitment problem that prevents bidders from unseating resisting and entrenched
incumbent directors of target companies through proxy ﬁghts. Unlike bidders, activists are on
the same side of the negotiating table as other shareholders of the target, and hence, enjoy
higher credibility when campaigning against the incumbent board. Building on this insight, we
demonstrate that although both bidders and activists can use similar techniques to challenge
corporate boards (i.e., proxy ﬁghts), activists are more eﬀective in relaxing the resistance of
incumbent directors to takeovers. The fact that most proxy ﬁghts are launched by activists
and not by bidders, and the large number of activist campaigns that resulted in a takeover bid
by a third party, are consistent with shareholder activism being the market solution for the
bidder’s commitment problem.
Our analysis also highlights the complementarity between shareholder activism and takeovers.
Activists beneﬁt from the possibility that companies in which they invest will become a takeover
target, while bidders, who interpret the presence of an activist as a signal that the target is
available for sale, are more likely start takeover negotiations when the target has an activist as
a shareholder. We show that since the model’s comparative statics is sensitive to the existence
of the treatment eﬀect in equilibrium, our analysis can be used to create identiﬁcation strategies of the treatment eﬀect of shareholder activism in takeovers. Overall, the analysis sheds
light on the interaction between M&A and shareholder activism.
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A

Proofs of main results

Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose condition (6) holds and π A − π I ≥ κ/α. Notice that
these conditions are not mutually exclusive. Based on Proposition 1, if the ﬁrst round of the
negotiations fails, the activist will run and win a proxy ﬁght. Moreover, based on Lemma 1,
in the second round of the negotiations the activist and the bidder will reach an agreement in
which the bidder is expected to pay q + π A . Therefore, in the ﬁrst round of negotiations, the
incumbent board will reject any oﬀer lower than q + π A . Similarly, the bidder will not agree to
pay more than q + π A per share, since he can always wait for the second round of negotiations,
∆
and pay q + π A after the activist wins the proxy ﬁght. Notice that π A ≤ 1−m
. Overall, if there
are arbitrarily small waiting costs to either the bidder or the incumbent board, they will reach
an agreement in the ﬁrst round of negotiations in which the bidder pays a premium of π A .
Second, suppose condition (6) holds and π A − π I < κ/α Based on Proposition 1, if the ﬁrst
round of the negotiations fails, the activist will not run a proxy ﬁght. Therefore, if the ﬁrst
round of the negotiations fails, the incumbent retains control of the board. Moreover, note that
∆
∆
∆
if π A − π I < κ/α then it must be either b ≤ 1−m
or 1−m
< δ/α. Since min{b, δ/α} ≤ 1−m
, it
∆
∆
must be b ≤ 1−m . Based on Lemma 1, if b ≤ 1−m then in the second round of the negotiations
the incumbent and the bidder will reach an agreement in which the bidder is expected to pay
q + π I . Therefore, similar to the argument above, the bidder and the incumbent board will
reach an agreement in the ﬁrst round in which the bidder pays a premium of π I .
Next, suppose condition (6) does not hold. Then, both conditions (3) and (5) are violated,
and therefore, condition (2) is violated as well. Based on Proposition 1, the activist never
runs a proxy ﬁght. Therefore, if the ﬁrst round of the negotiations fails, the incumbent retains
∆
control of the board. Based on Lemma 1, if 1−m
< b then the incumbent board and the bidder
will not reach an agreement in the second round of negotiations, and the target would remain
independent. Therefore, in the ﬁrst round of negotiations, the incumbent board will reject any
∆
oﬀer lower than q + b, and the bidder will not agree to pay more than q + 1−m
per share. Since
∆
< b, the parties will not reach an agreement in the ﬁrst round as well, and the target
1−m
remains independent in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3 . If the second round of negotiations succeeded and the target is acquired by the activist, then the activist implements his proposal if it has not been implemented
yet. Therefore, the post takeover target value is q + ∆. If the second round of negotiations
failed and the ﬁrm remains independent (that is, its ownership structure did not change), there
are two cases. First, if the activist controls the target board then she implements her proposal
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if it has not been implemented yet, and the target value is q + ∆. Second, if the incumbent
board retains control then he implements the proposal if and only if b ≤ ∆, and hence, the
target value is q + 1{b≤∆} ∆.
Consider the second round of negotiations. There are two cases. First, suppose that either
the activist controls the target board or the incumbent retains control and b ≤ ∆. The activist’s
proposal is implemented whether or not the bid fails. For this reason, the activist will not oﬀer
more than q + ∆ per share. Moreover, target shareholders will not accept oﬀers lower than
q + ∆, since they can always reject the bid and obtain a value of q + ∆ once the proposal is
implemented. Therefore, whether or not target is acquired, the activist’s payoﬀ is α(q +∆) and
the shareholder value is q + ∆. Second, suppose incumbent board retains control and b > ∆. If
the negotiations fail, the proposal will not be implemented and the activist’s payoﬀ would be
αq. If the activist acquires the ﬁrm, her payoﬀ is q + ∆ − (1 − α) π 2 , where π 2 is the oﬀer made
∆
to target shareholders. Therefore, the activist is willing to oﬀer up to q + 1−α
per share. The
∆
∆
. If 1−α
<b
incumbent board and the activist will reach an agreement if and only if b ≤ 1−α
∆
then the takeover fails and the shareholder value is q. If ∆ < b ≤ 1−α then the incumbent and
the activist reach an agreement in which π 2 ≥ q + b > q + ∆. Therefore, target shareholders
approve any agreement reached by the activist and the incumbent, and target is acquired by
∆
+ (1 − s) b.
the activist. In this case, the expected shareholder value is q + s 1−α
Consider the proxy ﬁght stage. There are three cases to consider. First, if b ≤ ∆ then the
activist’s payoﬀ is α(q +∆) whether or not she gets the control of the board. Therefore, she has
∆
no reason to run and incur the cost of a proxy ﬁght. Second, if ∆ < b ≤ 1−α
then the activist
always loses the proxy ﬁght if he decides to start one. The reason is that shareholders know
that if they elect the activist they will get q + ∆ whereas if they reelect the incumbent, the
∆
activist will take over the target and pay shareholders on average q + s 1−α
+ (1 − s) b, which
is strictly higher. Anticipating her defeat, the activist never runs a proxy ﬁght in this region.
∆
Third, if 1−α
< b then the shareholder value is q + ∆ if the activist gets the control of the
board, and q otherwise. Therefore, shareholders always elect the activist if she runs a proxy
ﬁght. The activist’s payoﬀ is α(q + ∆) − κ if he runs a proxy ﬁght, and αq otherwise. Therefore
∆
the activist runs a proxy ﬁght only if κ/α ≤ ∆. Combining this condition with b > 1−α
yields
(8).
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Proof of Corollary 1. Based on Proposition 2,
R B
R∞
A

α

π I (∆) dF (∆) + BA π A (∆, α) dF (∆) if b < BαA − κ/(1−s)

α
b

α
R∞
κ/(1−s)
B
v (α) =
π I (∆) dF (∆)
if αA − α ≤ b < δ/α
b


R
R

 ∞ π (∆) dF (∆) + b π (∆, α) dF (∆) if δ/α < b
I
b
δ/α A

≤ 0, and therefore, v (α) can be rewritten
The assumption BA ≤ κ/(1 − s) implies BαA − κ/(1−s)
α
as in (10). The comparative statics of w (α) with respect to α is trivial. Based on (10), we can
write
Z ∞
BA
∆dF (∆) − b (1 − F (b)) −
w(α) − v(α) = (1 − s)
[F (b) − F (min{b, δ/α})] ,
α
min{b,δ/α}

and therefore

0
w(α)′ − v(α)′ = (1 − s)
A }/s
(δ/α) max{0,κ−B
f (δ/α) +
2
α

if b < δ/α
BA
[F
α2

(b) − F (δ/α)] if δ/α ≤ b

which is non-negative. Also, based on (10),


0
if b < δ/α
v ′ (α) =
(δ/α) max{B2A ,κ} f (δ/α) − (1 − s) BA2 [F (b) − F (δ/α)] if δ/α ≤ b
α
α

Therefore, if δ/α ≤ b then

v ′ (α) > 0 ⇔ (δ/α)

f (δ/α)
(1 − s)BA
>
F (b) − F (δ/α)
max {BA , κ}

(18)

Recall that δ/α is a decreasing function of α and δ/α ∈ [δ (α) , b], where δ/α > 0. Therefore,
v ′ (α) > 0 as δ/α → b, i.e., when α is suﬃciently small. Hereafter, we assume that v ′ (α) > 0
for all α ∈ [0, α]. This holds, for example, if s is suﬃciently close to 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Note that part (iii) follows directly from Corollary 1 and the
text that precedes the proposition. Let α∗ (y) be the number of shares the activist buys in
equilibrium conditional on signal y. The proof has several steps.
First, we prove α∗ (0) = 0. Note that Pr [ζ = 0|y = 0] = 1 and Pr [∆ < 0|y = 0] = 1.
Based on Proposition 2, the probability of a takeover is zero and ﬁrm value is q. Since the
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share price cannot be smaller than q, regardless of the beliefs of the market maker (on or
oﬀ the equilibrium path), the activist’s expected proﬁt from submitting any order α > 0 is
non-positive. Therefore, the activist does not invest. Hereafter, we denote α∗ (1) as α∗ .
Second, we prove α∗ ≤ α. Suppose on the contrary α∗ > α. Then, on the equilibrium
path the market maker observes that the activist bought α∗ shares before the price is set, and
hence, the market maker sets the price to be q + µ̂h (α∗ ). Indeed, since in any equilibrium
y = 0 ⇒ α = 0 (the ﬁrst step), the market maker infers that y = 1. However, in this case, the
activist’s proﬁt is non-positive, yielding a contradiction.
Third, we prove that the price function is given by (14). Since the market maker expects
the activist to buy no shares if y = 0 and α∗ ≤ α shares if y = 1, the market maker sets the
price at q + µh (α∗ ) if the activist buys α shares or less. Indeed, the market maker expects the
takeover to take place if and only if y = 1 and ζ = 1, which happens with probability µ. If the
activist buys more than α shares, which is an oﬀ-equilibrium event, then the market maker
observes α and sets the price to be q+µ (α) h (α) where µ (α) is the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs of the
market that ζ = 1 given that the activist decided to buy α > α shares. We assume µ (α) = µ̂,
which guarantees that such deviation is not proﬁtable (i.e., the market maker assumes y = 1).
This argument gives (14).
Fourth, we prove (13) has a unique solution. Since h (·) is an increasing function, the left
hand side (“LHS”) of (13) is a strictly increasing function of α∗ . If α∗ = 0 then LHS = 0 and
if α∗ → ∞ then LHS → ∞. Since LHS is a continuous function, (13) has a unique solution.
Fifth, we prove that if an equilibrium exists, then α∗ = min {α∗∗ , α}. If an equilibrium
exists and the activist submits α ≤ α, then her expected proﬁt conditional on y = 1 is
Π (α, α∗ ) = α (q + µ̂h (α) − p (α, α∗ )) = α (µ̂h (α) − µh (α∗ )) ,
where the second equality follows from (14). There are two cases to consider. First, suppose on
the contrary α∗ > min {α∗∗ , α}. If α∗∗ ≥ α then α∗ > α contradicts the second step above. If
α∗∗ < α then α∗ > α∗∗ implies α∗ (q + µh (α∗ )) > R. Notice that p (α∗ , α∗ ) = q+µh (α∗ ), which
implies that the activist spends more than R in equilibrium, yielding a contradiction. Second,
suppose on the contrary α∗ < min {α∗∗ , α}. Then, α∗ < α∗∗ implies α∗ (q + µh (α∗ )) < R.
Suppose the activist deviates by increasing her buy order by 0 < ε < min {α∗∗ , α} − α∗ . Since
α∗ + ε < min {α∗∗ , α}, we have (α∗ + ε) (q + µh (α∗ )) < R and p (α∗ + ε, α∗ ) = p (α∗ , α∗ ) =
q + µh (α∗ ). So the activist has enough funds to by additional ε shares at a price of q + µh (α∗ ).
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Notice that
Π (α∗ + ε, α∗ ) = (α∗ + ε) (µ̂h (α∗ + ε) − µh (α∗ ))
≥ (α∗ + ε) (µ̂h (α∗ ) − µh (α∗ ))
= (α∗ + ε) (µ̂ − µ) h (α∗ )
> α∗ (µ̂ − µ) h (α∗ ) = Π (α∗ , α∗ )
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from h (·) being a non-decreasing function. Therefore, this
deviation is proﬁtable, yielding a contradiction.
Sixth, we prove that an equilibrium exists. Based on the ﬁfth step, if an equilibrium exists,
then α∗ = min {α∗∗ , α}. We show that no proﬁtable deviation exists. Similar to the second step
above, it can be shown than any deviation to α > α is sub-optimal. Moreover, any deviation
to α∗∗ < α ≤ α implies R < α (q + µh (α)) = αp (α, α∗ ), which means that the activist spends
more than R, which is not possible. It is left to consider a deviation to α < min {α∗∗ , α}. Note
that
Π (α, α∗ ) = α (µ̂h (α) − µh (α∗ ))
≤ α (µ̂h (α∗ ) − µh (α∗ ))
= α (µ̂ − µ) h (α∗ )
< α∗ (µ̂ − µ) h (α∗ ) = Π (α∗ , α∗ ) ,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from h (·) being a non-decreasing function. Therefore, such a
deviation is always sub-optimal.
Proof of corollary 2. From part (i) of Proposition 4, condition δ/α∗ < b can be rewritten
as max {δ/α∗∗ , δ/α} < b. Since α∗∗ is the unique solution of (13) and α (q + µh (α)) is strictly
increasing in α, δ/α∗∗ < b ⇔ (δ/b) (q + µh (δ/b)) < R. Noting that h (δ/b) = h (0) implies
< b, as required.
that δ/α∗∗ < b is equivalent to δ q+µh(0)
R
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